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METHODOLOGY
Anonymisation of geographical distance 
matrices via Lipschitz embedding
Martin Kroll1 and Rainer Schnell1,2*
Abstract 
Background: Anonymisation of spatially referenced data has received increasing attention in recent years. Whereas 
the research focus has been on the anonymisation of point locations, the disclosure risk arising from the publishing of 
inter-point distances and corresponding anonymisation methods have not been studied systematically.
Methods: We propose a new anonymisation method for the release of geographical distances between records of 
a microdata file—for example patients in a medical database. We discuss a data release scheme in which microdata 
without coordinates and an additional distance matrix between the corresponding rows of the microdata set are 
released. In contrast to most other approaches this method preserves small distances better than larger distances. The 
distances are modified by a variant of Lipschitz embedding.
Results: The effects of the embedding parameters on the risk of data disclosure are evaluated by linkage experi-
ments using simulated data. The results indicate small disclosure risks for appropriate embedding parameters.
Conclusion: The proposed method is useful if published distance information might be misused for the re-identifica-
tion of records. The method can be used for publishing scientific-use-files and as an additional tool for record-linkage 
studies.
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Background
he amount of microdata gathered by governmental, 
research, and other institutions has increased consid-
erably within the last decades. Due to laws such as the 
American Freedom of Information Act and the princi-
ples of good scientiic practice, more and more of these 
datasets are available for secondary analyses. In many 
research ields such as medicine or social research, 
microdata iles contain information about individuals. 
But the units of observation in a microdata ile might also 
be hospitals and other health care providers, schools or 
households. Today, many data sets available for second-
ary analyses already contain location information for the 
units of observation. Given such data, techniques from 
spatial statistics can be used to approach research prob-
lems such as disease clustering and their causes [1].
Anonymity of spatial data
In principle, the anonymity of research data on individu-
als and organisations should be guaranteed. herefore, 
the release of microdata is strongly regulated in most 
countries. In general, it is required that the re-identiica-
tion risk of anonymised records should be very small. Of 
course, the technical details to comply with national legal 
requirements vary between countries and may be open to 
interpretation, as for example in the case of the American 
HIPAA rules [2].
he re-identiication problem of anonymised records is 
discussed in the technical literature on statistical disclo-
sure control. here, a distinction between attribute and 
identity disclosure is made [3]. As in the majority of pub-
lished papers, we will focus on identity disclosure: We 
consider the risk of re-identiication of at least some of 
the sampling units whose data are published.
Re-identiication is much easier if spatial information 
for the observational units is available in the published 
data. El Emam and Arbuckle point out that location is 
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often one of the critical pieces of information for a success-
ful re-identification attack (see [4], p. 127). his issue has 
been addressed in various research papers (see “Previous 
work” section below). Most of these contributions attempt 
to preserve the spatial distribution of units within the cor-
responding geographical areas and the underlying areas 
themselves. Although attacking a ile containing geo-
masked coordinates is more di cult than attacking an 
unmasked ile, all masking methods for coordinates per-
mit the computation of a (approximate) distance matrix. 
his distance matrix can also be used for an attack, for 
example by the attack described in the “A graph theoretic 
linkage attack” section. herefore, encrypting coordi-
nates as, for example, by the method described in [5], may 
not be suicient. It should be mentioned, that a distance 
based attack can also be successful (for small iles) if no 
additional information for a person (for example, age or 
sex) is available: Only a ile with identiiers and a corre-
sponding distance matrix are needed.
We focus on the preservation of distances only, for 
example the geographic distances between the occur-
rences of a given disease in a population. It is intuitively 
appealing that dispensing with the underlying geographi-
cal area for anonymisation might permit the release of 
more accurate distance information.
Since the distance matrix can be computed from the 
geographical coordinates, it is evident that releasing 
even perturbed location data ofers a potential attacker 
more information than the release of an approximate 
distance matrix. Given any extra information (e.g., per-
turbed coordinates), our attack can still be performed or 
even improved. Although the release of distance matri-
ces instead of coordinates makes re-identiication attacks 
more di cult, releasing the exact distance matrix D 
might give a potential attacker suicient information 
for an attack. herefore, releasing a modiied version 
D˜ of the original distance matrix D will hopefully make 
re-identiication unreasonably di cult. he proposal of 
a new modiication method for the release of distance 
matrices accompanied by microdata and the empirical 
study of its privacy are the topics of this paper.
Previous work
Anonymisation of spatial data has been addressed in 
many research contexts (for example, see  [6]). Compre-
hensive reviews of the available methods have been given 
by Armstrong et al. [7] and O’Keefe [8].
Following  [9], the methods sketched in  [7] can be 
sorted into three categories: (1) methods that aggregate 
spatial points, (2) methods that modify coordinates, and 
(3) methods that release contextual data only. Examples 
of the irst category include point and areal aggregation. 
Translation, rotation, scaling and random perturbation 
belong to the second group, whereas the release of the 
distances to nearest neighbours provides an example of 
the third category.
Due to its simplicity, aggregation is the most popular 
method for releasing administrative or health data con-
taining spatial references. Using areal aggregation, a sui-
cient level of conidentiality can often be achieved. For 
example, the US HIPAA rules 45 CFR 164.514 demand 
aggregation of ZIP codes. However, the protective efect of 
aggregation is coupled with a massive loss of precision in 
the calculation of distances, especially for entities in close 
proximity. herefore, the problem of choosing suitable 
aggregation units has received a lot of attention [10, 11].1
A special case of random perturbation is proposed 
in  [12]. In that paper the authors suggest moving each 
point into the area of an annulus centered at this point. 
Both the inner and the outer radius of the annulus are 
determined as dependent on the relative population 
density such that the chosen anonymity requirement 
(k-anonymity in this case) is satisied. he authors show 
that their approach outperforms aggregation concern-
ing cluster detection under the privacy requirement of 
k-anonymity. Moreover, they show that their approach 
sufers from a minimal loss in cluster detection perfor-
mance compared with random perturbation but yields a 
considerably higher degree of privacy protection.
Another innovative strategy for the anonymisation of 
spatial point data is due to Wieland et al. [13] who devel-
oped a method based on linear programming which moves 
each point in the data set as little as possible under a given 
quantitative risk of re-identiication. A modiication of this 
technique for small data sets was suggested in [14].
However, this approach also intends to preserve the 
spatial distribution of the sampling units, whereas our 
focus is on releasing spatial information only through 
the distance matrix (in addition to microdata without 
coordinates).
In the literature, the preservation of distances has been 
mentioned only in passing. A notable exception is the 
paper by Kerschbaum [15] which focuses exclusively on 
distance preservation. In that paper, a regular grid of ref-
erence points is generated and a hash value is assigned 
to each of these grid points. For a given point location 
hash values of adjacent grid points and further numerical 
measurements (for example, distances to adjacent grid 
points) are stored. From this information the distance 
between two points can be exactly recovered if their dis-
tance is smaller than a threshold d which depends on the 
acuteness of the grid. If the distance is greater than 2d no 
distance can be computed.
1 In  [43], a method using Monte Carlo simulations is proposed for this 
problem. Nevertheless, the distance approximations resulting from this 
method will impede clustering procedures.
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Our method does not use a regular grid but makes use 
of reference sets whose elements are randomly sampled 
points. Moreover, even small distances are preserved 
only approximately by our method rather than exactly 
which contributes to the resilience of our method against 
attacks.
Examples of statistical procedures compatible with the 
new anonymisation method
If the intended analysis requires the computation of dis-
tances, the necessary information is given by the distance 
matrix D containing the pairwise geographic distances 
between the units of observation. Using this kind of 
information is suicient for statistical analyses of many 
research problems. For example, methods for the detec-
tion of spatial clusters of infectious diseases are impor-
tant in epidemiology. In this context, the article  [16] 
introduces a test whose test statistic does only depend on 
the interpoint distances and thus can be calculated from 
the distance matrix only.
In general, the new method described in this article is 
intended for statistical analyses of inter-record distance 
matrices in combination with additional attributes. Such 
data are widely available in infectious disease modeling, 
environmental epidemiology and socio-geographics. We 
discuss a data release scheme in which the microdata 
without coordinates and an additional distance matrix 
between the rows of the microdata set are released. We 
assume that the one-to-one correspondence between the 
rows of the microdata set and the rows/columns of the 
distance matrix is known. Examples of applicable meth-
ods are agglomerative clustering algorithms (see [17], 
ch. 4) and nearest neighbour imputation (see [18], p. 52). 
Another example is geographically weighted regression 
(GWR) since the computation of GWR requires only 
microdata and a weight matrix. Since the weight matrix 
can be computed from the distance matrix (see [19],  p. 
123, eq. (5.35)), our method can be used along with GWR 
as well. Furthermore, methods based on truncated dis-
tance matrices such as PCNM [20] can be used with our 
anonymisation procedure. he same is true for indices 
of spatial autocorrelation such as Moran’s I or Geary’s C. 
Concerning spatial information, the computation of such 
quantities is based on a spatial weight matrix which can 
be computed from the distance matrix (see [21], ch. 7.4). 
If the deinition of the weight matrix is based on contigu-
ity, it can be shown empirically that spatial autocorrela-
tion indices will be approximated well.
Methods
We introduce a new technique for generating an 
anonymised version D˜ of a spatial distance matrix D to 
be released in addition to corresponding microdata. 
After the description of the technique in the “Contractive 
anonymisation of spatial point data” section, the accuracy 
of the resulting distance approximations is discussed ana-
lytically and using examples in the “Accuracy of the pro-
posed method” section.
Contractive anonymisation of spatial point data
We assume the following situation: A data holder Alice is 
willing to release microdata including geocodes that per-
mit useful distance approximations between the observa-
tional units. hus the published data should be available 
to any researcher (for example, Bob) who wants to per-
form analyses based on this data. Hence, the data must 
be suiciently anonymised by Alice such that re-identii-
cation of the observational units by a malicious adversary 
Eve is only a remote risk.
We assume that Alice has already created a suiciently 
anonymised version T free from any spatial reference of 
the original database T0 by using the variety of prevail-
ing methods for this purpose. Furthermore, we assume 
that for each record ti of T a geographic point datum pi 
is known to Alice. For instance, the original database T0 
could have contained the household addresses of patients 
and their corresponding geographic coordinates.
Let N ∈ N denote the number of rows in T. he 
exact distances between the entities in T are stored in 
an N × N-matrix D = (dij) where dij is the distance 
between the i-th and the j-th record in T. he output 
of our method consists of an N × N  distance matrix D˜ , 
which is an approximate version of D more suitable for 
being released in addition to T.
Our algorithm depends on two embedding parameters: 
d ∈ N (the dimension parameter) and k ∈ N (the size 
parameter). he efect of these parameters on the accu-
racy and the provided anonymity will be studied below. 
he algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Choose the embedding parameters d and k.
2. Create d random reference sets R1, . . . ,Rd of size k, 
i.e. Ri = {ri1, . . . , rik} for i = 1, . . . , d. he elements 
rij of the reference sets shall be drawn independently 
and uniformly from a geographical area A. For the 
rest of this paper we assume that A coincides with 
the geographical area from which the spatial point 
data considered are taken, although other choices are 
possible.
3. In this intermediate step each point location p is 
mapped to Rd via 
 where the coordinate functions fi are deined by 
p �→ f (p) := (f1(p), . . . , fd(p)) ∈ R
d
(1)
fi(p) := min
j=1,...,k
d(p, rij)
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 and d(p, r) is the distance between pi and r. his step 
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
4. he approximate distance d˜(p, q) between two point 
locations p and q is computed as the ℓ∞-distance 
between the embedded points f(p) and f(q) in Rd, i.e. 
5. he output is the pair (T , D˜) where D˜ = (d˜ij) and the 
d˜ij are deined through d˜ij := d˜(pi, pj).
An exemplary implementation of the above algorithm 
in the programming language R [22] is provided in Addi-
tional ile 1: Appendix of this article.
Remark he embedding into Rd applied in step 3 
above is a variant of a technique which is commonly 
denoted as Lipschitz embedding  [23]. Lipschitz embed-
dings have been used in other scientiic areas, for exam-
ple to reduce the number of dimensions (for example 
in biochemistry [24]) or to provide a vector-based rep-
resentation of non-vectorial data [25]. Note that in our 
proposal, Lipschitz embedding is not used to obtain a 
simpliied representation of the given data, but as a 
technique for distance modiication. In particular, the 
Lipschitz coordinates fi(p) generated in step 3 of the 
algorithm are not released at all and therefore cannot be 
used by an attacker to re-identify entities from the pair 
(T , D˜).
In the ield of data privacy, the use of Lipschitz embed-
ding has been suggested for privacy-preserving string 
(2)
d˜(p, q) := �f (p)− f (q)�∞ = max
i=1,...,d
|fi(p)− fi(q)|.
comparisons  [26]. Furthermore, other embedding tech-
niques such as the Johnson-Lindenstrauss embedding 
have been studied in other settings  [27] where data pri-
vacy is essential.
Accuracy of the proposed method
In general, accuracy of distance computations is linked 
with the provided degree of anonymity and vice versa. 
More accurate released distances will give more informa-
tion to the adversary. herefore, the attacker will study 
the amount of error in distance calculations caused by 
the embedding technique.
Before considering the efect of the embedding param-
eters d and k, we state a fundamental property of Lip-
schitz embeddings.
Proposition 1 (Contractivity of Lipschitz embedding) 
We have d˜(p, q) ≤ d(p, q) for all p, q, so that the approxi-
mate distance d˜(p, q) never exceeds the original distance 
d(p, q).
For a proof of Proposition 1 we refer the reader to [28]. 
he contractivity of Lipschitz embedding is a well-known 
fact and of importance because it is a desirable property 
for data analysis techniques such as clustering  [24]. he 
results of cluster analysis are only slightly afected by the 
embedding, because the metric space formed by the rel-
evant points is compressed, not distorted. Most other 
geo-masking methods such as aggregation, random per-
tubation or donut-transformation do not have this con-
tractivity property.
he statement of Proposition  1 is rather imprecise 
because it does not describe to what extent distances 
between pairs of points are transformed in depend-
ence on the embedding parameters d and k. Hence, it is 
important for the adversary Eve to study the efect of d 
and k on the accuracy of the transformed distances.
he dependence of the accuracy of transformed dis-
tances on the dimension parameter d is obvious: As d 
increases, the maximum in (2) is taken over more inde-
pendent realisations |fi(p) − fi(q)| of the same random 
variable. Since d˜(p, q) is bounded from above by d(p, q) 
due to Proposition 1, a irst conjecture is obvious:
1. he approximation of distances is likely to become 
better if d increases.
Let us now consider the dependence on the param-
eter k. We denote a point for which the minimum over 
all rij ∈ Ri in (1) is attained as an anchor point. For k = 1 
the anchor point must be the same (namely ri1) for all p 
and all reference sets Ri. Albeit the coincidence of anchor 
points for diferent point locations p and q does not 
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Fig. 1 Illustration of step 3. The size parameter k is chosen equal to 3 
and the elements of the reference sets are sampled at random from 
the administrative area of the United Kingdom. The coordinate fi(p) 
of the point p (black square) with respect to the random reference set 
Ri = {ri1 , ri2 , ri3} is given by the minimum distance from p to a point 
of this reference set. We have d(p, ri1) = 308.9, d(p, ri2) = 262.3 and 
d(p, ri3) = 162.7, thus fi(p) = min{308.9, 262.3, 162.7} = 162.7. All 
distances are measured in kilometers
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guarantee that their distance is accurately approximated 
(the approximate distance can even be 0 in this case), 
it is easy to see that it makes accurate approximation 
more likely. For k ≫ 1, it is likely that the corresponding 
anchor points difer for many reference sets if p and q are 
far away from each other. Under this condition, original 
distances will be underestimated.
his reasoning results in two additional conjectures:
2. Larger values of k lead to a less accurate approxima-
tions of distances.
3. In general, shorter distances will be better preserved 
than longer distances.
hese efects will be demonstrated by an example 
of three pairs of British cities with diferent spatial dis-
tances: Liverpool–Manchester (50 km), London–Shef-
ield (228 km) and Plymouth–Newcastle (540 km). 
Figures  1, 2, 3 in Additional ile  1: Appendix show the 
conjectured efects for these distances using embed-
ding parameters k ∈ {1, 3, 5} and d ∈ {20, 100, 500}. Each 
combination of parameters was replicated in 100 embed-
dings. he plots show kernel density estimators of the 
approximated distances. he plots support both conjec-
tures: Increasing values of d decrease the deviation of 
approximated distances; therefore the approximations 
are closer to the original distances. he same efect can 
be observed as k decreases. he third conjecture (smaller 
distances are much better preserved than larger dis-
tances) is also obvious in the plots.
In general, Lipschitz embedding will result in randomly 
contracted distances (as already stated in Proposition  1 
above). Increasing values of k and decreasing values of 
d will increase the variance of approximated distances. 
Choosing these parameters accordingly will make the 
recovery of the original distances for an adversary more 
di cult.
Example: inluence of Lipschitz embedding on data mining 
tasks
In this section we consider the efect of distance modii-
cation via Lipschitz embedding on two speciic data min-
ing tasks.
For the irst demonstration, we empirically determine 
the rate of correct nearest neighbour classiications 
depending on the embedding parameters d and k. Near-
est neighbour classiications are essential for agglom-
erative cluster analysis, therefore this computation is 
of interest. Note that given aggregated data instead of a 
modiied distance matrix, this computation would be 
impossible.
We investigated the accuracy of our method by means 
of a distance matrix obtained by calculating the pairwise 
distances between 400 randomly chosen hospitals in Eng-
land. he distances between the hospitals were modiied 
using the proposed Lipschitz embedding technique. Based 
on the modiied distance matrix for each record its near-
est neighbour was determined. We considered parameter 
settings with k ∈ {5, 20, 35, 50} and d ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20} . For 
each combination of parameters 10 iterations were con-
ducted and the average proportion of correct nearest 
neighbour classiications was calculated. he results of 
this experiment are shown in Fig. 2. Obviously, even for 
small values of d and large values of k (implying heav-
ily modiied distances) the proportion of correct nearest 
neighbour classiications is large. Only for the smallest 
dimension considered (d = 5) a rapid decrease in correct 
classiications depending on k can be observed.
As second demonstration, we describe the preserva-
tion of relative orderings through the proposed variant of 
Lipschitz embedding. For this purpose two ixed points 
were chosen. One point was located in the centre and the 
other point at the border of the chosen geographical area. 
he Spearman rank correlation ρ was computed between 
the resulting ranks for the original and the approximated 
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mated distances for different choices of d and k of all distances in the data files to two fixed points. The black lines refer to a fixed point in the centre 
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distances of all points to the two selected points. Figure 2 
shows the decrease of ρ if d decreases and k increases. 
his result is in accordance with Conjectures 1 and 
2 above. Conjecture 3 is illustrated by the diference 
between the central point and the border point. For a 
point at the boundary, larger distances to other points are 
not as accurately preserved by the Lipschitz embedding 
as smaller distances.
Finally, it should be mentioned that for some other 
methods of distance modiication (for example, Kersch-
baum’s method) data mining tasks such as this cannot be 
computed at all.
Empirical privacy analysis of distance matrices
Standard methods for the evaluation of privacy of dis-
tance matrices seem to be unavailable.2 herefore, we use 
a recently published de-anonymisation attack based on 
graph matching [29].
A graph theoretic linkage attack
he graph theoretic linkage attack described here is 
related to a general attack mode termed  linkage attack 
2 Attacks and attacking methods for (medical) research data are rarely pub-
lished [44]. Geographical information in these attacks is used as quasi-iden-
tiiers [45], not as distance information. In the context of health data, to the 
best of our knowledge there is only one (roughly) reported attack method 
using distance information [4].
which is widely discussed in the literature on statisti-
cal disclosure control [3]. Linkage attacks assume access 
to an identiied auxiliary microdata ile by the attacker. 
By comparing common attributes of this auxiliary ile 
(termed the identification file) with the published micro-
data ile (termed the  target file), the attacker tries to 
match the records of both iles. In this context, common 
attributes in both iles (such as sex, age, ethnicity in 
the case of personal microdata) are referred to as quasi-
identifiers [30] or indirect identifiers [9].
he power of linkage attacks using quasi-identiiers has 
been demonstrated repeatedly (for an example, see [31]). 
he most popular demonstration is due to Sweeney [32]: 
She was able to detect the record corresponding to the 
governor of Massachusetts in a published health data ile 
by linking it with a publicly available voter registration 
list. Recently, some theoretical results on linkage attacks 
have been derived [33].
To prevent linkage attacks, many of the well-known 
anonymisation techniques for microdata modify the 
original data. For instance, the R package sdcMicro [34] 
provides such strategies for the anonymisation of tabular 
data. Probably the most popular strategy used to pre-
vent unambiguous linkage is provided by the concept of 
k-anonymity [32]. A microdata table satisies k-anonym-
ity if each record cannot be distinguished from at least 
k − 1 other records by means of the quasi-identiiers. 
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herefore, a microdata ile is k-anonymous if in case that 
an entity from the identiication ile can be linked with 
a given record from the target ile, then it can be linked 
with at least k − 1 other records as well.
Generally, the set of all potential matches between tar-
get and identiication ile (which we denote with V here-
after) contains correct matches (true positives) as well as 
incorrect ones (false positives). When an entity i from 
the identiication ile can be matched with more than one 
observation unit t of the target ile, diferent potential 
matches are equally likely.
However, when additional information about the dis-
tances between the units of observation in the target ile 
is released and the attacker can calculate the distances 
between the entities in the identiication ile, the compat-
ibility of matches in V can be examined by the attacker. 
By deinition, an element of V is a pair (t,  i) where t is 
a unit of observation from the target ile and i a known 
entity from the identiication ile such that t and i coin-
cide concerning the released attributes. herefore, the 
pair (t, i) corresponds to a potential match.
Given two such pairs (t1, i1) and (t2, i2), the attacker has 
to decide whether these pairs are compatible. his deci-
sion can only be made based on the knowledge of the 
released distance between t1 and t2 (which is possibly 
modiied or perturbed by the data holder) and the knowl-
edge of the proper distance between i1 and i2.
he precise deinition of compatibility is critically 
dependent on the way the distances between the obser-
vation units have been modiied by the data holder before 
releasing the data. Below we will give a speciic deinition 
for our case of interest, where the distances are modiied 
by the variant of Lipschitz embedding introduced in the 
“Methods” section.
he result of checking all potential matches of V in 
terms of their compatibility can be modelled by means of 
a simple undirected graph G = (V ,E). he vertex set V of 
this graph is just the set of all potential matches as above. 
he edge set E is deined as follows: two matches are tied 
by an edge (i.e., the corresponding vertices are adjacent) 
if and only if they are classiied as compatible. From now 
on, we refer to this graph as the compatibility graph.3
Having constructed the compatibility graph, the 
attacker will try to ind a set C of vertices in V of maxi-
mum size such that any two vertices from C are adjacent. 
In the ield of algorithmic graph theory, this problem is 
referred to as the maximum clique problem  [35]. he 
adversary will consider the matches corresponding to the 
3 For a more detailed account of the deinition of the compatibility graph, 
we refer the reader to [29], where an example for constructing a compatibil-
ity graph (termed product graph in that paper) is given.
vertices of such a maximum clique C and drop other 
potential matches.4 he maximum clique problem for a 
given graph is known to be NP-hard. herefore, the 
development of techniques for solving this problem 
exactly or at least approximately [35] has received a lot of 
attention in the literature. For the computational experi-
ments in  the “Empirical privacy analysis of distance 
matrices” section, we used the C++ implementation of 
the exact maximum clique detection algorithm intro-
duced by Konc and Janežič in [36].
We give a deinition for the compatibility of two 
matches when the released distances between the units 
of the target ile are modiied by the proposed Lipschitz 
embedding. Consider (t1, i1), (t2, i2) ∈ V . he attacker 
has direct access to d˜(t1, t2) only and not to d(t1, t2); 
knowledge of the latter would permit him to compare 
d(t1, t2) and d(i1, i2) directly: if d(t1, t2) ≈ d(i1, i2) the 
matches (t1, i1) and (t2, i2) would be classiied as compati-
ble and (t1, i1)(t2, i2) would be taken into the edge set E. If 
only d˜(t1, t2) is known, the attacker can use a diferent 
strategy. In this setting the Lipschitz embedding of i1, i2 
into Rd is repeated many times for the current parameter 
values d and k to estimate the distribution d˜(i1, i2).
5 his 
estimated distribution of d˜(i1, i2) can inally be compared 
with the known realization of d˜(t1, t2). his can be seen 
as constructing an empirical α-tolerance interval by tak-
ing the smallest (with respect to its length u − l) interval 
[l,u]i1,i2 which contains at least the proportion α ∈ (0, 1) 
of the simulated realisations of d˜(i1, i2). Using this 
approach, an attacker might deine the matches (t1, i1) 
and (t2, i2) as compatible if and only if d˜(t1, t2) ∈ [l,u]i1,i2.
Note that this way of attack has large computational 
costs, because Monte Carlo experiments have to be per-
formed for many pairs of points from the identiication 
ile. herefore, this is only reasonable for moderate sizes 
of V.
A simulation to study the privacy preserving properties of the 
Lipschitz embedding
Since the contractive properties of the proposed method 
are well understood, now the privacy properties of the 
embedding have to be studied. For this, we conducted 
simulation studies on the basis of two diferent scenarios. 
In the irst scenario, we performed a simulation study 
based on a target and an identiication ile from a dataset 
of 847 geocoded hospitals in England.6 We sampled 400 
4 If the maximum clique is not uniquely determined we assume that the 
adversary chooses one maximum clique at random.
5 We make the conservative assumption that the parameters are known to 
the attacker. If the parameters are unknown, re-identiication becomes even 
harder, because the parameters d and k have to be estimated.
6 his dataset is available at http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/
list_of_hospitals.
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records for each ile with an overlap of 40 hospitals 
belonging to both iles. As quasi-identiier the Trust-
Code7 was selected. To make assignments of the vertex 
labels more di cult, only the irst two characters of the 
trust code were used. In the second scenario, we con-
ducted the same experiments on a target and an identii-
cation ile consisting both of 500 simulated records on 
individuals from Germany with an overlap of 50 records. 
In this scenario, sex and age were chosen as 
quasi-identiiers.
We assume no measurement errors and no missing 
values in either data set. herefore, if a sampling unit is 
part of the target and identiication ile, both the geo-
graphic coordinates and the quasi-identiiers match. 
his assumption of perfect background knowledge for 
the attack is very conservative, since better information 
makes re-identiication more likely. However, it seems to 
be more appropriate to err on the conservative side and 
be protective, rather than permissive, with potentially 
sensitive data (see [4], p. 127).
A visualisation of the target and the identiication iles 
for the two scenarios considered are given in Figs.  3 
and 4, respectively. Note that the vertex set V of the com-
patibility graphs contains 7976 (resp. 15517) nodes of 
which only 40 (resp. 50) correspond to true matches. For 
this reason, performing a classical linkage attack in both 
scenarios is not promising and the target iles would cer-
tainly be regarded as suiciently anonymised if no addi-
tional distance information had been released.
he linkage attack was repeated using the data sets 
described above for diferent values of k and d.
In a irst experiment, we set the parameters 
d ∈ {20, 100, 500} and k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. he threshold 
α varied between 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. For each parameter 
combination, the simulation (consisting in the genera-
tion of D˜ , generation of the compatibility graph, maxi-
mum clique search and extraction of the corresponding 
matches) was repeated 20 times.
In a second experiment, we used parameter values 
which should yield higher levels of protection than the 
set of parameter in the irst experiment. herefore, we 
considered d ∈ {20, 60, 100} and k ∈ {10, 12, 14, . . . , 30} . 
Here, we used α = 0.1 and α = 0.5 for the threshold 
parameter α. Again, for each parameter setting the simu-
lation was repeated 20 times.
Data preparation and analysis were done with the 
statistical programming language R [22]. As indicated 
above, we used the C++ implementation of the maxi-
mum clique detection algorithm proposed in [36] which 
7 he National Health Service Act 2006 created NHS trusts “(...) to provide 
goods and services for the purposes of the health service”. he codes are 
available at http://data.gov.uk.
is available from http://www.sicmm.org/~konc/max-
clique/. he number of iterations was set to 20.000.000; 
the maximal clique found until this iteration was used as 
result.
Success of the attack was quantiied with precision 
(prec) and recall (rec), the most widely used measures for 
data linkage processes [37]. For example, [38] used preci-
sion and recall as measures in an evaluation of automatic 
de-identiication procedures. Further studies of this type 
using the same measure are reported by [39].
Here, TP denotes the number of successful re-identii-
cations, FP the number of false assignments and FN the 
number of common entities of target and identiication 
ile that were not detected by the attack. Precision and 
recall are deined by
Note that in our framework the attacker would primar-
ily be interested in attaining high precision, implying a 
high proportion of true positives among all assignments. 
his is due to the fact that correct re-identiication of 
some entities would permit the re-identiication of addi-
tional entities. herefore, we focus on precision to meas-
ure the attacker’s success. Accordingly, 1 − prec can be 
interpreted as a measure of the empirically attained ano-
nymity. However, we will also report briely results con-
cerning recall as a measure of which proportion of the 
overlap of both iles can be detected by the attacker.
Results
Using the parameter settings of the irst experiment for 
the English hospital data, Figures 5, 6, 7 show high lev-
els of success for the attack for all parameters considered. 
Hereby, we demonstrated the practical utility of the pro-
posed attack: For unsuitable parameter settings as used 
here, the attack will yield successful re-identiications. 
he attacker can achieve a precision of nearly 0.5 (50 % of 
her re-identiications are correct if she chooses α = 0.5 ) 
given even the most secure parameter settings consid-
ered in the irst experiment (k = 10 and d = 20) (Fig. 6). 
his level of precision will be unacceptable for sensitive 
data in most applications.
However, a decrease in precision with increasing k is 
obvious for all but the largest number of dimension d 
considered here. For the smallest number of dimensions 
(d = 20), precision decreases rapidly with increasing k.
To investigate if higher levels of anonymity can 
be achieved by the proposed Lipschitz embedding, 
higher values of k (k ∈ {10, 12, . . . , 30}) were used in 
the second experiment. For the dimension parameter 
d ∈ {20, 60, 100} was chosen. he results for this settings 
are shown in Figs. 8 and 9.
prec =
TP
TP + FP
and rec =
TP
TP + FN
.
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For all levels of d considered, the precision approaches 
25 % for large k. Additional tests using even larger values 
of k ∈ {50, 100} did not result in a further decrease of 
precision.
his may be due to the limited size of the compatibil-
ity graph. his reasoning is based on the results obtained 
with the slightly larger iles for the German population 
data in the second scenario. On the German data, the 
embedding method results in a failure of the graph theo-
retic linkage attack: Whereas the attack achieves a certain 
amount of successful re-identiications for the irst exper-
iment (see Figs. 10, 11, 12), only a precision close to 0 can 
be achieved by the attack for suitable parameter choices 
in the second experiment (see Figs. 13 and 14). A natu-
ral explanation for this observed diference in attainable 
precision between the two scenarios is the diference in 
size of the compatibility graphs (15517 for the German 
population data compared to 7976 nodes for the English 
hospital data).
For the English hospital data, the results regarding the 
recall are similar to the results on precision. Whereas in 
Figs. 5 and 6 recall decreases with k at least for the larg-
est number of dimension considered (d = 500 in this 
case), the recall decreases only slightly with d and not 
with k for the second experiment and rarely exceeds 25 % 
(see Figs. 8, 9). For the German data, the recall does not 
approach 10 % for d = 20 and k ≥ 20 (see Figs. 13, 14).
However, as mentioned before, in our context recall is 
less important than precision since a large recall is of no 
use for an attacker if precision is small and correctness of 
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the re-identiication can not be evaluated. his is similar 
to the k-anonymity model, where some re-identiications 
might be correct, but the attacker has no way to check 
the truth of the identiications, since even when the 
attacker knows that a certain person’s record belongs to 
the target ile, an assignment of this person to a record 
will be correct with probability ≤ 1/k. herefore, by rep-
licating each simulation step 20 time, we aim to approxi-
mate the probability 1/k by generating an expected value 
for precision.
Based on this interpretation, we consider re-identii-
cation risks of more than 25 % as not suitable since this 
corresponds to k-anonymity with k < 4. his level of pro-
tection is higher than those accepted by some European 
data protection agencies in practice. For example, the 
implementation of statistical disclosure control for the 
German Census [40] aims for k-anonymity with k = 3. 
herefore, a precision of 25 % seems to be not unreason-
able for practical applications. he embedding method 
proposed here seems to meet this requirement.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new method for the 
modiication of spatial distance matrices that protects 
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against re-identiication. he proposed method combines 
two desirable properties for data protection methods (see 
page 123 in [41]):
1. For the intended class of applications, it allows accu-
rate statistical analyses.
2. It seems to possess the potential for high-level pro-
tection even if an adversary has in-depth background 
knowledge.
Due to the contractivity of the Lipschitz embedding, 
small distances will be preserved better than large dis-
tances. herefore, statistical models using local features 
will give accurate results despite the (intended) distortion 
of the distance matrix. For example, agglomerative clus-
ter analysis will give very similar results. In general, treat-
ing the transformed distance matrix as censored data 
might give additional options for analysis. For a compre-
hensive review of suitable statistical approaches for the 
analysis of censored data, see [42].
Of course, descriptive statistics based on the modiied 
distance matrix alone will be biased. However, with the 
exception of quantiles, publishing additional descriptive 
statistics of the unmodiied distance matrix seems not 
to increase the re-identiication risk for the graph based 
attack since this information is not used in the attack. 
Since no other attack on distance matrices is known 
at the moment, there is no way to assess the risk for 
unknown attack methods.
For one of our example data sets, we have shown that 
the only currently known attack on distance matrices 
fails if the embedding parameters are chosen carefully. 
For this data set consisting of simulated German popu-
lation data, choosing d = 20 and k = 30 resulted in very 
few successful re-identiications. Of course, for a given 
data set, the data custodian has to determine appropri-
ate values for d and k by simulations. However, similar 
considerations are necessary for all other geo-masking 
methods.
We consider the levels of privacy protection reported 
here as conservative estimates, since real world attacks 
will sufer from practical obstacles such as measurement 
and data processing errors in distances. Furthermore, the 
amount of overlap between target and identiication ile 
will often be lower, resulting in lower precision and recall 
of an attack. Finally, for large iles, the graph theoretical 
linkage attack becomes computationally expensive since 
the attack requires exponential resources with increasing 
size of the compatibility graph.
However, the privacy analysis presented here is based 
only on the graph theoretic linkage attack. To our knowl-
edge, no other attacks on distance matrices have been 
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published. herefore, for a detailed evaluation of dis-
closure risks for publishing distance matrices further 
research on attacks is needed.
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